How can CSOs be more resilient and prepared for such attacks? What are some of the manifestations of this trend and what are the examples worth following?

These issues were addressed in a recent panel discussion involving Bardhyl Jashari (Metamorphosis, North Macedonia), Mariam Kvaratskhelia (Queer Initiative, Georgia), Filip Vagač (PDCS, Slovakia), Maja Durlik (TechSoup Europe) and myself held at the MEGAPHONE 2024 event for civil society and activist in Bratislava. This article provides a summary of the discussion and offers practical tools and suggestions to mitigate these challenges.

The Terrain – Forms of Disinformation Targeting CSOs

Civil society organizations (CSOs) face an escalating assault from disinformation campaigns worldwide. These attacks are designed to undermine trust, erode credibility, and destabilize the critical roles these organizations play in protecting democracy and supporting social cohesion. As our recent Disinformation And Civil Society Mapping Reports covering four CEE regions demonstrate, distinct forms of disinformation targeting CSOs emerge in different regions, tailored to exploit local vulnerabilities.

In the Baltic states, disinformation thrives on societal and historical divisions. Narratives often portray CSOs as proxies for Western agendas, encouraging distrust among ethnic minorities and leveraging cultural flashpoints such as Soviet-era monument removals. Social media platforms are weaponized to spread polarizing content, dividing communities along ethnic and linguistic lines.

The Black Sea region sees disinformation aimed against organizations championing human rights, gender equality, and especially LGBTQ+ issues. Propaganda depicts these CSOs as agents of moral decay, using nationalist rhetoric to polarize public opinion. For example, narratives in Moldova frame pro-European CSOs as threats to sovereignty, accusing them of undermining traditional values and national identity.

In the Western Balkans, disinformation campaigns intensify during election periods, with both governments and opposition groups manipulating narratives to smear CSOs. By framing civil society actors as “foreign pawns,” these campaigns delegitimize their efforts in promoting electoral integrity, human rights, and EU integration. In Kosovo, disinformation exacerbates ethnic tensions, portraying CSOs advocating for inclusivity as undermining national interests.

The Visegrad region, particularly Hungary and Slovakia, is plagued by conspiracies accusing CSOs of being tools of “Western liberal elites.” These narratives suggest that CSOs aim to erode national culture and values. Amid broader societal fatigue from the war in Ukraine and economic pressures, such claims gain traction, painting CSOs as disconnected from the interests of local populations and serving foreign interests.

This region-wide disinformation assault is far from random. It strategically exploits cultural, political, and social divisions, leveraging themes of nationalism, xenophobia, and even legitimate criticism of globalization. By turning public sentiment against CSOs, these campaigns aim to dismantle trust, limit funding opportunities, and ultimately suppress the vital work of civil society in advocating for democratic principles and human rights.

The Fallout – How Disinformation Disrupts CSOs

The impact of direct attacks on CSOs extends far beyond reputational damage. It threatens their very existence.

Firstly, disinformation campaigns systematically erode public trust in CSOs. This de-legitimization often leads to reduced domestic and international funding. Claims that CSOs are “foreign agents” discourage local donors and governments from forming partnerships and entering into cooperation or even communication with CSOs.

Operational disruptions are another direct consequence. Many CSOs face cyberattacks, online (and in some cases also offline) harassment, and legal challenges, such as the so-called foreign-agent laws modeled after similar legislation in Russia. Georgia is the most recent example of a country adopting such legislation inspired by the Kremlin. In Hungary and Slovakia, for example, pro-Russian rhetoric coincides with domestic crackdowns on dissenting CSOs, aligning state and foreign agendas, with CSOs taking the heat.

Another significant impact of disinformation is increased polarization, which undermines the perception of neutrality in CSO activities. Once seen as impartial watchdogs, guarding democratic principles and values, CSOs are now painted by propaganda as partisan entities, undermining their influence in advocacy and policy-making.

The Toolkit – Building Resilience Against Disinformation

Given all these challenges and the worsening position of CSOs in many countries, the question is not IF but WHEN similar tactics will be employed also in other countries.

So, how can CSOs turn the tide and face these challenges? The resilience-building measures fall into two categories, one involving long-term strategic actions and the other one immediate response. The long-term strategy lays the groundwork for mechanisms and capacities to be used in times of crisis, while the immediate response measures are, as the name suggests, immediate steps to be made.

CSO Resilience Toolkit

Long-term strategic measures:

I. Build Support Networks and Alliances
Support networks and collaborations can strengthen CSO responses in times of crisis. Examples from countries such as Slovakia illustrate that such networks play a crucial role in building critical mass and serve as important mobilization tools. Such networks could include domestic partners or even international ones.

Partnerships with international networks provide critical support, offering public statements and messages of solidarity that foster resilience and collective strength.

Such alliances serve as reminders that, even in moments of isolation, civil society is not alone in its efforts to safeguard democratic values.

II. Strengthen Solidarity Within Civil Society

One of the most favorite tactics of autocrats is to divide CSOs and single out a specific group or issue for attack. Solidarity is the best response in such a situation, but it must be nurtured and sustained:

The silence of many local CSOs during challenging times highlights the urgent need to build stronger bonds within the community.

Supporting one another, especially during crises, reinforces the resilience and collective impact of civil society.

Solidarity is a powerful force that, when present, can make a significant difference, as demonstrated by the unwavering support of international allies.

III. Building Strong Bonds with Constituencies and Communities

To strengthen the impact of civil society, it is essential to foster meaningful connections with the constituencies and communities CSOs serve.

Make the work of CSOs more understandable and tangible to diverse groups, to build trust, enhance collaboration, and ensure that CSO efforts resonate with and address the real needs of the people.

Clear communication and active engagement are critical to demystifying CSO roles and demonstrating the tangible benefits of their work in promoting democracy, human rights, and social progress.

IV. Prepare and Plan for Escalation

Expect and plan for attacks against your organization and/or issues you are working on. Typical trigger events are elections, the introduction of new legislation, or court proceedings. Plan ahead and be ready:

Anticipate increased attacks as important events approach and proactively strategize to mitigate their impact. Strategic communication or crisis communication is essential.

Train staff and stakeholders on online and offline security measures to enhance safety and resilience against potential threats.

V. Decouple from Public Funding
Diversifying revenue streams ensures CSOs can withstand funding withdrawals resulting from smear campaigns. Leveraging crowdfunding and direct audience support can create a sustainable financial model.

VI. Strengthen Digital Defense
Enhanced cybersecurity measures and training for staff on digital hygiene reduce vulnerabilities to hacking and data breaches.

Immediate Response Measures

I. Spot and Prepare for Threats Early
Investing in real-time disinformation tracking and employing AI tools can help CSOs identify emerging narratives before they gain traction. The sooner a threat is recognized the better the chances of successful counter-action.

Set up social media listening tools to analyze content for mentions of your CSO, or names of key personnel.

Set up automated alert systems notifying you of viral content attacking your organization or staff.

II. Document and Report Attacks

CSOs have several avenues to counter disinformation attacks, reporting them to social media platforms using the Terms of Service, litigation or even filing criminal complaints. Yet all of these require documenting and reporting:

Reporting attacks to relevant institutions, while not always yielding immediate outcomes, is essential for creating a formal record.

Institutional documentation lays the groundwork for future accountability and sends a strong message that such actions will not go unnoticed.

It reinforces the expectation that institutions must address and respond to these threats effectively.

III. Strategic Communication and Counter-Narratives
Creating proactive content that resonates with communities is critical for effective counter-messaging.

Highlighting local success stories, aligning with cultural values, and refuting disinformation promptly can restore credibility.

Proactive storytelling in alignment with community needs has proven effective in the Baltics and Black Sea regions.

CSOs should be more than just mere victims in this information war as they are critical defenders of democracy. While this struggle often feels like an uphill battle, unity, solidarity, and innovative strategies can deter and counter the negative effects of such campaigns. By addressing these challenges head-on and preparing effective responses, civil society can continue its vital mission: safeguarding the values that underpin free and open societies.

Author: Daniel Milo, Countering Disinformation Subject Matter Expert, TechSoup Europe

Background illustration: yavdat

Resilient Together: How Civil Society Organizations Can Counter Disinformation and Build Stronger Communities